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Note: As with all posted court opinions on my website, the following
language is from the court. I received an email recently telling me the
age listed for Charles Shannon in the case, 13, was incorrect. The message
(from Nichole) stated that Charles was sixteen when he died; he had left
Nichole's house earlier the evening he died. The court uses this sad
occasion, the deaths of young people, to make needed changes in the common law.
-J. Pittman
Marlan Dale SHANNON, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Charles Shannon, Deceased v. L.K. WILSON
and Elizabeth Ashworth, Individually and as Partners of City Liquor, a Partnership
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
329 Ark. 143; 947 S.W.2d 349; 1997 Ark. LEXIS 400
June 23, 1997, Opinion delivered
W.H."Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal asking us to reconsider our decisions in Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965), and the line
of decisions following that ruling in which we determined that there is no liability imposed upon one who sells intoxicants to
minors for injuries caused by minors who became inebriated. Appellant asks us to modify our rule to allow the issue of whether
the seller is negligent to go to a jury for determination. We reverse and remand holding that, under the facts which may be
proved by the pleadings, a cause of action for common-law negligence against the vendor has been stated.
* * *
On the evening of January 28, 1995, Charles Shannon and Jarred Sparks, both aged thirteen, were passengers in a Ford
pickup truck driven by David Farmer, aged sixteen. Between 7:00 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., the three boys drove up to the
drive-through window of City Liquor, located in Fayetteville, Arkansas. An employee of City Liquor sold them a six-pack of
beer and a six-pack of malt liquor without asking for identification.
After leaving City Liquor, the three boys began drinking as they drove to St. Paul, Arkansas. At a pool hall in St. Paul,
David Farmer exited the vehicle. Charles Shannon and Jarred Sparks remained in the vehicle drinking the rest of the
liquor. At some time, the two boys left the pool hall in the pickup.
At approximately 9:10 p.m., the Arkansas State Police were notified of an accident in Madison County. Arriving at the scene,
police found the Ford pickup had left the road, traveled through a fence, hit a telephone pole and finally come to rest after hitting
a tree. The police surmised that the pickup was traveling at excessive speed and that the accident occurred while the driver was
attempting to negotiate a curve. Jarred Sparks was found in the driver's seat of the truck and Charles Shannon in the
passenger's seat. Both were pronounced dead at the scene. Blood tests revealed that Jarred Sparks had a blood
alcohol level of .10% and that Charles Shannon had a level of .07%.
* * *
In Carr v. Turner this Court first addressed the issue of whether a person who was injured in a collision with a drunk
driver had a cause of action against a tavern owner whose unlawful sale of liquor brought upon the
inebriation. This Court determined, at that time, that it should follow the view of the majority of other
jurisdictions in observing the common-law view that the proximate cause of any subsequent accident was
the consumption of liquor, not its sale. * * *
In Carr, we noted that the enactment of a dramshop act by the legislature would be the appropriate method to change the common-law principle.
Since Carr, this Court has been entreated to reevaluate the issue of a seller of alcohol's liability on numerous occasions.
Repeatedly we have held that absent a change in the common-law principle by the legislature, this Court would not depart from
the ruling in Carr and its progeny.
Since 1965, our holdings have been consistent in declining to impose liability on the provider of alcohol by holding
that the proximate cause of any injuries later occurring is the consumption of the alcohol, not its sale. In fact we have continually stated
that a dramshop act is the preferred measure to deal with this issue and that "such a measure should be the result of legislative
action rather than of judicial interpretation." Carr at 892, supra. For twenty years, we have followed precedents while stating
that the legislature should address this issue, and we have held to the contention that replacing the common-law rule is a matter
of public policy best left to the legislature. Despite this Court's preference for legislative action, there has been no action directly
addressing this troublesome question; so, we will address this issue now.
* * *
Carr was decided in 1965 utilizing a rule of law from the early 1800's. In the 1800's when the common-law rule was
formulated, most people walked and some rode in horse-drawn carriages, no unreasonable risk to third persons was created by
selling alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person or a minor. Today, patrons of bars and liquor stores no longer typically walk or
ride on horses. They almost always travel by motor vehicle. The reality of modern life is evidenced by the fact that most drinking
establishments and liquor stores provide patrons parking lots. * * *
Today, motor-vehicle crashes are the single greatest health hazard to people under the age of 45. Over 50% of all highway fatalities result from driving under the
influence of alcohol. Over 250,000 people died in the United States in alcohol-related motor-vehicle accidents in the years
between 1980-1990. * * *
Inherent in the common-law is a dynamic principle which allows it to grow and to tailor itself to meet changing
needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, which, if correctly understood, was not static and did not forever prevent
the courts from reversing themselves or from applying common-law to new situations as the need arose. If this
were not so, we must succumb to a rule that a judge should let others 'long dead and unaware of the problems of
the age in which he lives, do his thinking for him.'
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the holding in Carr is hereby modified to allow juries to determine whether the violation of the
criminal statute for selling alcohol to minors by a licensed vendor is the proximate cause of any subsequent alcohol-related injury
to a minor or third party. Due to the legislative enactment of a higher duty of care, a licensed vendor who violates the regulatory
policy and the criminal statutes of this state by selling alcohol to minors should be held accountable for any consequences of that
action if a jury determines the results were foreseeable. Therefore, such violations of the statute prohibiting the sale of
alcohol to minors by a licensed vendor can be presented to the jury as evidence of negligence with the jury to determine
whether such was the proximate cause of any harm.
* * *
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