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             the judiciary (ch 13) 
            Reread Article III of the US Constitution 
            Summons:  http://www.supremecourtus.gov/index.html 
            Points to ponder:  
            1. The   	case of Marbury v   	Madison (1803) is vital to an appreciation of the development of the   	judiciary in the US political system 
            2. The   	federal courts in the US have two severe institutional problems 
            
              -  unlike members of Congress and the president, federal judges are not  elected and so don’t have a “mandate” that will legitimize, or make legitimate, their   	decisions (most--but not all--states judges are popularly   	elected [A. Liptak, "Rendering justice" NYT 25 May 08]);  indeed, throughout the 1990s the US courts were about as likely to be  regarded unfavorably as favorably, probably because of a perceived  leniency towards criminals and doubts about equal justice (Americans   	only a little better off, but much less anxious), but it should be   	noted that the US Supreme Court met with levels of approval 20 points higher; on the other hand, a new survey shows a marked decine in the public's view of the Supreme Court (A. Liptak & A. Kopicki, "Approval rating for justices" NYT 7 Jun 12)
 
              -  the second problem for courts is that they can issue rulings and orders  but cannot implement them, depending on the other branches of  government to take action to make judicial decisions effective;  although the Supreme Court ordered desegregation of public schools with  “all due deliberate speed” in 1954, it was still issuing desegregation  orders in the 1970s because of the failure of school districts to  comply; for another example, after the Supreme Court ruled in 1963 that  school prayer is “in direct violation of constitutional rights”  (Abington v Schempp), the teacher-reported incidence of public school  prayer dropped from 60% in 1962 to 28% in 1964-65, a change that might  look impressive except that more than one-quarter of teachers still  reported being out of compliance (rumors persist that public school  prayer still goes on)
 
             
             3. Lacking a mandate and depending on others to implement its  decisions, courts try to avoid appearing to be political institutions,  but courts are inevitably political 
            
              -  recall the hot button issues decided by the courts—death penalty,  medical use of marijuana, prayer in school, detention of suspected  terrorists and non-state combatants after the September 2001 attacks,  abortion, same-sex marriage, flag burning, the phrase “under God” in  the Pledge of Allegiance, protections for those arrested and prosecuted  for criminal offences, and many more
 
              - not all Supreme Court cases are as provocative as these, as is suggested by   	a nice Linda Greenhouse piece
("Devil in the details" NYT 28 May 07)
              
                    - on  the other hand, what seems like a small change, making it easier to  disqualify those "soft" on the death penalty from capital cases, may  have significant effects on criminal law, as Adam Liptak reports ("Ruling likely to spur" NYT 9 Jun 07)
 
                  - somewhere  in the middle, perhaps, is the suit by Alaskan fisherman and other  residents against Exxon in connection with a 1989 oil spill; the PBS  Newshour carried a report on oral arguments before the Supreme Court in February 2008 when Exxon sought to have a $2.5 billion award set aside (the Court handed down it's decision on 25 June 2008 as A. Liptak reports in "Damages cut" NYT 26 Jun 08); to give an another middling example, the Supreme  Court ruled on the question of whether public school  districts have to pay for the private school tuitions of students needing special education services (T. Lewin, "Supreme Court to address" NYT 30 May 09) that the district is thought, rightly or wrongly, to be unable to provide (yes, as it turns out)
 
                 
               
              -  witness all the political conflict over judicial nominations--consider  President Bush's nominations of Pickering for the Court of Appeals and  Meirs for the Supreme Court, threats in the 2004 by  Republicans to use the "nuclear   	option"  against potential filibusters by Democrats of Bush appointees, and the  2009 struggle over Obama's nomination of Sotomayor for the Supreme  Court--and note that over 90% of judicial nominees just happen to be of  the same party as the president who names them
 
              -  there is evidence that judges are themselves aware of the political  environment in which they operate and the public response to their  decisions, as is delightfully illustrated in the “switch   	in time that saved nine” 
 
             
            4.  In line with the remark that “judges find the law, they do not make  it” (the "legal model," 485-88) a number of legal principles--which are important in their own  right and ought not to be totally discounted--are often invoked to  soften the political appearance of courts  
            
              - stare decisis  (translated as “let it stand”) or precedent: the idea that courts  should be bound to rule as they have in the past; but there are plenty  of instances in which precedents fall--Brown v Board of Education of Topeka (1954), which   	declared segregation of public schools unconstitutional overturned the   	precedent of Plessy v Ferguson (1892) which said that public institutions might maintain separate  facilities for whites and blacks so long as they were equal (making  clear the intention to overturn the Plessy precedent, Chief Justice  Warren wrote in Brown, “We conclude that, in the field of public  education, the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate  educational facilities are inherently unequal”); for another example,  when the Supreme Court found a Texas sodomy conviction of two men to be unconstitutional in 2003, the Court overturned a precedent   	it had established just 17 years earlier
 
              - neutral  principles:  courts should hold to legal principles without  consideration to the particulars of the current case or the  implications of its decisions for individuals or policies
 
              - judicial  restraint:  courts should defer whenever possible to the other branches  of government and, when they do intervene, should leave detailing the  remedies to others as much as possible
 
             
            5. In   	observing Supreme Court decisionmaking, one needs to distinguish the “vote”   	and the “opinion”   
            
              -  in the case of X v Y, the vote tells how many rule in favor of X and how many in favor of Y, and this  is really only of concern to X and Y because they are directly  impacted, directly win or lose, as a result of the Court vote (in the  medical marijuana case, Gonzales v Raich [2005], in which the vote was  6-3, the only people concerned with the vote are Gonzales, whose side  got six votes, and unhappy Raich, whose side got three votes)
 
              - the opinions are the writings of legal reasoning given by justices, explaining why  they voted as they did, and these opinions are used by others in the  political system (legislators, presidents and other executives, judges,  lawyers, and, for that matter, interest groups and political parties  and all the other players) to understand what the judges say the “law”  requires or permits; only if five or more justices on  the Supreme Court (an absolute majority) agree to sign on to a single  opinion does the Court clearly establish what, at least for the moment,  the law is (an example of a case where the absence of a five-justice  majority leaves the law unsettled is the affirmative action case of Bakke);  some of the most interesting politics in our political system involve  the bargaining among the justices on the drafting of opinions so as to  build a coalition of five or more joining together to issue a majority  opinion; 
 
             
            6. The strategic model (487 ff) can be thought of more broadly than just having to do with the political sensitivity of judges in making decisions, the degree to which take into account political forces in making their decisions; in addition, there is plenty of evidence that judges act strategically to achieve their objectives 
            
              - there are reports that when President Nixon said he might disobsey a Supreme Court ruling ordering him to turn over his tape recordings in the Watergage case if the decision was not unanimous, justices rallied to decide the case unanimously
 
              - recalling that ithe Chief Justice assigns the job of writing an opinion when he is in the majority, (479) there were claims that former Chief Warren Burger would switch his vote or hide his preference so as to control who would write the opinion so as to influence what the opinion would say
 
              - ask me no questions, I'll tell you no lies: there was an interesting news article (A. Liptak, "When the justices ask questions" 25 May 09) in the Times on some research that suggests that the number of questions, in particular the number of  challenging questions, posed by Supreme Court justices to lawyers at  hearings helps predict how the Court will decide and that the questions justices pose are used to sway their colleagues
 
             
            Questions to   consider:  
            1. In general terms, how do the first three articles of the Constitution differ from  each other?  In particular, how does Article III compare as a whole  with the legislative and executive articles? 
             2. Architecture as political symbolism.  Ever been in a courtroom?  Ever seen Law and Order?   How might the design of courthouses and courtrooms be intended to  achieve a certain political effect?  How do other aspects of  court—dress, language, ritual—contribute to this effect? 
             3. What is judicial review?  How did the courts come to have the power  of judicial review?  How would US government be different if the courts  did not have this power? 
             4. Think  about this:  Between 1803 and 1978, congressional acts were declared  unconstitutional only 105 times, that’s 105 times out of more than  60,000 laws passed in that time, so a rate of  0.175%.  (On the other  hand. an average of nearly 20 state and local laws are declared  unconstitutional each year).   In other words, the Supreme Court wields  its power to strike down laws passed by the US Congress only  infrequently (just as presidents use their veto rarely).  Why? 
             5.  On Sonia Sotomayor's confirmation, there are are now six Catholic members of the the Court (and the other three are Jewish). Focusing on the Catholics, what  would the attitudinal model (486-87) predict to  be the implications of this for abortion and other  cases involving religion? (Consider Linda Goodstein's report, "Sotomayor would be sixth" NYT 30 May 09.) Sotomayor is also  the first Latina. What effect might that have on her decisions? On those of her colleagues? (See Liptak's report ["The waves" NYT 30 May 09] on this.) 
            6. What was the Korematsu case (1944). Of what possible relevance is it today? 
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